Lord Keynes is so Confused it’s not Even Worth It


Here is a statement from this post:

“So praxeological truths can be used to make contingent predictions by means of conditional statements (e.g., if x, then y) about the future, but the Austrian is not a “praxeologist” when doing this, but a ‘forecaster.'”

However, the Austrian IS a praxeologist when doing this. The praxeologist isn’t even stating whether “x” will actually occur!

Jeez. I am not even going into his confusions about the Austrian position on marginal utility.


I could be giving Lord Keynes way too much credit. He could just be the worlds biggest troll for all I know.

Things I am not Aware of

So I read this paper: http://www.philosophie.uni-hamburg.de/Team/Cordoba/Materials/oc_Foundations-PraxEcon-05-final_2013-05-28.pdf

Because a commenter by the name of Keshav Srinivasan told me to read this paper. Now if this author is not idiosyncratic, then there were a couple of things I wasn’t aware of.

1. Mises does not view his system as axiomatic.

2. Rothbard and Hoppe are wrong to call it axiomatic.

3. There is a difference between axiomatic and analytical approaches.

Now, I have always agreed that the action “axiom” is not a synthetic a proiri proposition. Furthermore, I am not even convinced that there is any such thing as a “synthetic a priori” proposition for reasons I will not go into.

There is one error committed on Keshav’s part, one of them being that he says the deductions the author is making are axiomatic. Which, according to the author’s view, is incorrect.

Also Major Freedom, in my view, is over-reacting at the author’s view that praxeology it is not technically speaking axiomatic. They are still valid deductions, even if you don’t call the approach axiomatic.

So the point of the title was to express how unaware I am of certain philosophical terms that the author uses. However, I am alive to the concepts these terms signify, so this is not too much of an issue. But if the author is correct, then this answers Keshav’s question of why Mises did not write Human Action in the same style as Euclid’s Elements.

Parellels to Abortion

I find that if when we draw parallels to more traditional conceptions of property, then we can often find the proper way the law ought to deal with situations. Many people do not view abortion as a property issue because many people separate the concepts of life and property. Of course there is nothing logically wrong with making such a distinction. But if the law recognizes this distinction, then there will always be a conflict (I am simplifying this) between the life of the baby and the property rights of a mother. However, I think a libertarian should only support a law whose two functions are the enforcement of property rights, and the enforcement of contracts. Life should only be viewed through the prism of property rights. Under this view, the baby has property rights and the mother has property rights. So I will attempt to view the issue of abortion under this view.

Here is the abortion scenario:

Two people engage in intercourse knowing the chances of getting pregnant is 1%. If the people engaging in intercourse are not cognizant of the biological facts regarding sex, then this scenario would be different. The woman gets pregnant and decides to have an abortion.

Scenario tantamount to this:

The woman plays a fun game and she is aware this will result in a person appearing on her property. It’s irrelevant for what end this game accomplishes for her. Her action is assumed and given in this scenario. She is aware, before playing the game, that evicting this person will result in said person’s death. How could this game result in a person appearing on her property? Well, lets just say it was hooked up to some magical system where a it gave another person the unquenchable desire to enter the property of this woman. The point is that this person is in no way responsible for entering her property. However, her eviction will not result in the death of this person if she decided to wait for a period of time.

Let us analyze, the individual actions that take place.

Action 1: The mother plays the game.

Action 2: The mother evicts the person.

So therefore, the question becomes, which action, if any, is illegal under a strict property rights framework? Action 1 does not violate the property rights of anyone, and therefore can in no way be illegal. Action 2 is a bit more complicated.

In action 2, she may be violating the property rights of this person and this action may therefore be illegal, because she has the option of waiting and evicting at a point where the person will be harmed much less or a significant loss in the probability of dieing.

Walter Block’s theory of eviction (I am not sure if he created this theory or where he published this theory) is that the amount of possible harm must be minimized when exercising your right to evict another person from your property. So if someone walks on your land, you cannot just shoot a bazooka at them immediately! You must ask them to leave first, etc.

So now the question is, how much must a person sacrifice before engaging in their right of eviction?

If the woman needs to wait, she is sacrificing her time. Time has a market value, as people know, called interest. Is there a way to quantify exactly how much she is losing? Exactly how much of a loss is she suffering merely by the person being on her land? She could own a farm, and this person may be messing up her crops. Is there is a precise point at which her loss crosses his death probability that its okay for her to evict him? Now this is a thorny issue, and I concede I don’t know the answer. It may just be a simple matter of convention.

Now I could imagine a libertarian saying, any loss whatsoever is a violation of her property rights, and is therefore permissible for her to evict him. However, under this view, would it not follow that I may use my bazooka if that’s all I had on hand at the moment? Any possible inconvenience may be interpreted as a loss.

Anyway I have gone way over 20 minutes.

Weird Math Conclusions

Weird Math Conclustions

\displaystyle  \sum_{n=1}^\infty n = 1 + 2 + 3 + \ldots = -1/12 \ \ \ \ \ (5)

This is something I find so mind boggling. I think the real question is: Does infinity exist inside the imaginations of people? Or does infinity an actual property of real objects? (Minus the possibility that the imaginations of people are also “real”)

law of marginal utility is not what you think it is

For this blog, I will write about topics for 20 minutes and that is all.

Many people think about the law of marginal of utility and think about value scales. Well, value scales don’t exist, unless you are talking about a value scale in a very abstract sense.

I believe Rothbard, among many other Austrians, are very confused about this. If you are going to read this blog, you will get used to the fact that I probably not going to look up many of the things that I make reference to. Maybe I will later if people want, but many people may not read this blog.

Back to marginal utility. Whenever Mises talks about any economic laws, they are only in reference to actual actions that take place. So, when a person is thinking of a value scale, this is an action IN ITSELF. Therefore, value scales can’t be inherent in making actions. When I perform any action, I don’t choose this action among a list of actions that I may have partaken in. Instead, the law of marginal utility is a proposition (analytic a priori) that is inherent in actions themselves. Performing an action is tautologous to valuing something. I would like to give credit to Adam Knott (praxeology.org) on this, but I still think his formulation is in error, which I must reserve for another post.

For those who may be confused, praxeology makes no synthetic propositions. Praxeology takes action as given. It does not analyze the metaphysical grounds for accepting the action axiom. It merely analyzes the axiom and accepts its truth.

So, we now have the proposition: Performing an action is valuing something. Surely, I can right now perform an action that I don’t value, thereby disproving your proposition. Well my 20 minutes is up, so I should answer this objection in my next post.

Human action is the production of change in some determination held by the subject.